This article addresses to the appropriate modeling of loss given default (LGD) for the retail business sector. We assume small or mid-size loans that are assigned in a standardized way and collateralized by residential or commercial property. The focus on this specific type of loans entails two major advantages: Firstly, reduction of complexity is followed by easier-to-grasp methodology and increased handiness of results when comparing with other recent approaches in the field. Secondly, the focussing allows to take into account the characteristic properties of the housing market and its underlying uncertainty and so choose a tailor-made modeling for the collateral. 
Introduction and motivation
Loss Given Default (LGD) is one of the key measures when modeling and managing credit risk. It captures the percental loss the bank faces in case of a defaulting obligor. Since 2006, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) allows banks to use their own rating approaches for the purpose of calculating the required equity for credit collateralization -i.e. a so called
Internal Rating Based Approach (IRBA). This concept stipulates the idea of expected loss as a product of three factors:
The first factor P D represents the probability of default (PD), the second one EAD denotes the amount of unredeemed outstanding debt at the moment the obligor defaults, the exposure at default (EAD). The third component yet is the loss given default (LGD) as percentage of nonrecoverable debt related to EAD. Banks using the advanced rating approach are allowed to estimate these parameters single-handedly by means of internally devel- 
where LGD i and EAD i are the percentage loss and the outstanding debt in case of default of the ith obligor. Taking expectations we receive
where for the last line we identified the case of no default with the absence of any loss. Slightly simplifying notation by P D i for P (D i = 1) and assuming deterministic exposure at default EAD i , we obtain
When we compare this to the equation provided by the BCBS, we state that the notation used of the latter implicitly assumes that both the percentage loss and the exposure at default are known with certainty. Deviating from that we assume in this article uncertainty with respect to the LGD and identify the LGD in the BCBS sense with the expected loss given default
Even though the equations and the discussion above stress the importance of LGD for banks, the scientific debate seems to be biased towards an over-intense discussion about default probabilities. One reason for that may be the fact that the conceptual requirements of the BCBS with respect to the loss given default had not been specified that clearly until recently. Another reason could be that in a general framework the modeling of LGD cannot be reasonably done without simultaneously modeling the PD component. There The existing literature concerning theoretical aspects of LGD, however, restricts itself to a very general and hardly applicable view of the topic. The theoretical models usually account for the possible dependence of PD and
LGD in one of the following ways: Frye (2000) , Dev/Pykhtin (2002) , Hillebrand (2005) , van Damme (2011) und Jacobs (2011) model the recovery rate as one random variable and the assets of the obligor as a second one and let both of them be driven by one latent factor. Jokivuolle/Peura (2003) and Pykhtin (2003) choose correlated stochastic processes for the firm value on the one hand and the value of the collateral on the other hand. The resulting formulas are highly complex but still vague for lack of concretion towards a realistic and practice-oriented type of collateral. Consequently, trying to catch 'all by one', these approaches end up at the lowest common denominator. Typically, this common denominator is found to be geometric Brownian motion which then again can neither satisfy researchers nor practitioners.
As we acknowledge the impossibility to capture the heterogeneity of different LGD estimation problems within one general and still powerful model, we enter the alternative path of specification: In this paper we focus on one single but typically quite important portion of a bank's credit portfolio, the part of the retail business where loans are collateralized by residential or commercial property. We look at loans, that are conferred in standard way to an obligor, which typically is represented by a private individual or a small or mid-size company 1 .
We now explain how this focus allows us to neglect the phenomenon of correlated PD and LGD by means of economic latent factors described above and thereby jettison part of the methodological over-complexity. This modeling is supported by some recent empirical results of Grunert/Weber (2009) and Grunert (2010) (2013)). Secondly, we introduce a cost factor that captures the liquidation efforts that may also affect the amount of loss. This approach acknowledges the requirement of the Basle committee, which provides workout costs to be included in the definition of
LGD. Thirdly, our model easily captures the existence of loan-specific rank structures. We regard this to be necessary as also the retail business is often affected by situations where one collateral is used for the securitization of more than one loan. If one or several other creditors are in a superior or in the same rank, this has an immediate effect on the bank's risk position.
Finally, the analytical tractability of our model allows to compute sensitivities of the LGD formula for key parameters in closed form which could prove useful for practitioners when thinking of risk steering.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we present the overall modeling framework. Section 3 provides a closed-form solution for the expected loss given default, while section 4 analyzes the derived formula and investigates sensitivities with respect to the parameters of the model. Section 5 concludes.
The basic model
We first simplify notation and drop the index i for the remainder of the article, i.e. we write E[LGD|D = 1] for the expected loss given the default of a representative obligor. As mentioned above we build our model based on analogies taken from option pricing theory. For that purpose we need at least one source of uncertainty. An obvious candidate is the value of the collateral which we denote by C. Its future development being uncertain we regard C = C t as a stochastic process.
We use the following notation: The variable t indicates calendar time.
Initially, this can be identified with the starting date of the loan, later it may be any point in time where revaluation of the loss given default is assessed. We generalize slightly treating T D as a variable. As motivated above, for the sake of sufficient practical relevance we further assume that liquidation takes place with some delay at the point in time T L (time of liquidation) with Consequently, we define this parameter to be non-random. The interest rate r represents the bank-internally used refinancing rate. It consists of the riskfree rate plus an additional bank-specific risk premium and is also assumed to be constant here.
With these assumptions, the loss profile LP at default reads as follows:
It is easy to see that the structure of the loss profile looks like the payoff of an option. If we drop the nominal N in a first step, the option type is that of a long put option with strike EAD, i.e. the loss is in-the-money as soon as the underlying (the discounted collateral net cost) falls below the EAD 4 . If we additionally take the nominal into account, we have an offsetting position for collateral values between zero and N , i.e. a short put with strike N . The combined position is that of a bear put spread.
The expected loss given default is given by the expected loss profile related to the total exposure and multiplied by 1 − γ which accounts for residual recovery: 
Here, the parameter EAD N C represents the non-collateralized share of the unredeemed loan. For fully uncollateralized loans, we have EAD N C = EAD, so that the LGD is only driven by the residual recovery process.
For the remainder of the article, we assume collateralized credit engagements. Treating the exposure at default as non-random, the only random factor influencing the loss profile and therefore the loss given default, is the value of the collateral. Focussing on residential or commercial property, we model the value of the collateral as an exponential Ornstein-Uhlenbeckprocess (OU) as motivated above. Moreover, we assume that the market value of the collateral asset can be represented at any point in time T > t as • Returns of real estate assets fluctuate over time, though they exhibit some mean-reverting trend to a long-term average.
• Returns are serially correlated over time.
Furthermore, the use of this process guarantees the collateral value to stay positive. The dynamics of the return process Y t are described by the following stochastic differential equation: At this point of the paper it is important to emphasize the following: We will make use of aspects of option pricing theory, which suggest themselves when looking at the loss profile and its option-like payoff. However, we still derive a traditional expectation under the physical measure. From a con- It is straightforward to show that for all t < T the solution of equation (2.5) is given by
Obviously, Y T is a Gaussian process with the following conditional moments:
2κ(T −t)
) . (2.8)
As one should expect, for the long-term limit we obtain
We state that even though the expected value can increase without any bound depending on the shape of Ψ, the variance remains limited. Two more interesting features of the process have to do with the parameter κ.
We have
Though an isolated view on this measure may be misleading, in combination with other risk measures (e.g. value at risk) the information may nevertheless prove useful.
as well as
For an infinite speed of mean-reversion, the return process becomes deterministic. For κ = 0 however, there is no feedback between the current level of return Y t and the number Ψ t , we have a classical Brownian motion plus a deterministic drift component.
We conclude this section by bringing the results from the return to the price level of the collateral. We receive given by equations (2.7) and (2.8). Additionally, we observe the probability that the collateral value C T exceeds a critical value x is given by
With lim x→0 d = ∞, we obtain P (C T > 0) = 1, i.e. the value of the collateral cannot become negative.
The expected loss given default
In this section we derive an analytical solution for the expected loss given default. With the model setup of the previous section and the related assumptions, the LGD is influenced by a couple of parameters and we can write
We start by providing the main result concerning the expected loss given default: 
Theorem 3.1 As of time t, the expected loss given default for an obligor defaulting at time T D is given by
The formulae satisfy an economically interesting homogeneity condition.
Proposition 3.3 For any π > 0 we have
E[LGD T D (πEAD, πN, πC, k, T D , T L , γ, r, Ψ, κ, σ)] = E[LGD T D (EAD, N, C, k, T D , T L , γ, r, Ψ, κ, σ)], (3.9)
e.g., the expected loss given default is homogeneous of degree zero with respect to EAD, N and C.
The proof is an immediate consequence of equations (3.1)-(3.5). The economical statement of this mathematical finding is that for the LGD only the relationship between the three parameters matters, while absolute values have no influence. This ensures that all obligors are considered in the same way (especially, independent of the firm size).
We investigate the analytic structure of the derived formula a little deeper.
For the purpose of a better understanding, we look at some examples based on concrete numbers. First, we analyze graphically, how the rank structure influences the expected LGD. We compare two cases of loans with even characteristics except that the first loan exhibits a senior position of a third party amounting to a nominal of N = 50, whereas in the second case this is not the case (N = 0). We let the long-term mean of real estate returns be constant Finally, we analyze the effect of different cost factors on the LGD value.
We also keep today's value of the collateral flexible and focus on the scenario of an upturn in the market for residential property (α = 0.02, β = 0.08).
In our example, the cost factor may vary between 1% and 20%, the other One clearly observes that the cost factor k influences the expected LGD in a negative way which is in line with our intuition. The effect is most pronounced for collateral values close to the EAD. If the collateral value is too small to cover the nominal N of the senior parties, the cost factor is of minor relevance, the same holds true when the collateral value is far beyond the EAD. 
Sensitivities
It is crucial for any bank to quantify, evaluate and control the default risk of their credit portfolio. As any information that serves this purpose should be valuable, it might prove useful to know about the influence of single parameters on the expected loss or the expected LGD, respectively. Clearly, the value of this information is evident when thinking of designing new credit contracts: The bank then may quantify how contract parameters as for example the value of the collateral influences the expected LGD. But also for existing engagements there is a multitude of applications, e.g. the knowledge about the influence of liquidation efficiency and cost factors on the LGD may lead to consequences on liquidation policy.
By means of our model we are able to quantify key sensitivities of the
LGD formula with respect to its parameters in closed form. While one could investigate influence of any model parameter, we focus on an (in our opinion) appropriate choice of the most important ones.
The first sensitivity we derive is the one with respect to the value of the collateral C, which -in analogy to option pricing theory -we name Delta: 
Proposition 4.1 For the Delta of the expected LGD (Theorem 3.1) it holds:
∂E[LGD T D ] ∂C = (1 − γ) [ − n(d) σ Y · C + N EAD · σ Y · C (n(d * ) − n(d)) −(1 − k)e −r(T L −T D ) e µ Y + 1 2 σ 2 Y EAD [ Φ(−(d + σ Y )) − Φ(−(d * + σ Y )) + 1 σ Y (n(d * + σ Y ) − n(d + σ Y )) ]] ,(4.∂E[LGD T D ] ∂C = (1−γ) [ − n(d) σ Y · C −(1−k)e −r(T L −T D ) e µ Y + 1 2 σ 2 Y EAD [ Φ(−(d+σ Y ))− n(d + σ Y ) σ Y ]] ,(4.
2)
where we have Obviously, if the lending bank is in senior position (N = 0), the delta is at a constant level of minus one percentage point for very low collateral values. This value results from the fact that an increase of the collateral value by one unit also reduces the expected loss in total amounts by (almost) one unit. Divided by the EAD, which is 100 in this example, we receive the effect on the expected loss rate there to be -1%. With the analogy to option pricing stated above, recall that the payoff profile of LGD without nominal N resembles the position of a long put. For a collateral value close to zero, this option is far in-the-money. With increasing value of the collateral, the reduction on the expected loss is lower and finally tends to a level of zero for high collateral values. Here, the put option is far out-of the money, so that a further increase of the underlying value has nearly no effect on the value of the option.
If a third-party senior position exists with a nominal, there is an additional effect. For very low collateral values, the effect on the expected LGD is close to zero: Here, an increase of the collateral's value only helps the first-tier creditors because the probability of any liquidation revenue that exceeds the nominal is rather low. Coming closer to the nominal, the potential loss reduction strengthens more and more. After exceeding the nominal value we have a shifted version of the first case described above: from the maximum effect of -1.00%, a further increase of the collateral's value will first result in weaker effects and finally fade out. Once more making use of option theory terminology, the LGD profile can be described as a combination of a short put with strike N = 50 and a long put with strike N + EAD = 150 (i.e. a bear put spread): For low collateral values, both options are far in-the-money and the effects (+1% for the short put and -1% for the long put) offset each other. Approaching the strike of the short put, the potential effect of the short put decreases from the value of +1% to zero while the long put is still far in-the money with a delta of -1% dominates, the sum of the two therefore evolves from 0 to -1%. With the collateral's value increasing further, the short put loses any influence and we have the shape of the long put's delta as in the example without any senior third-party.
The second sensitivity we investigate more deeply is the partial derivative of the expected loss given default with respect to the time of liquidation T L :
Proposition 4.3 The Tau of the expected LGD is given by:
where As already suggested by Figure 2 , the effect observable in this example heavily depends on the choice of the long-term mean Ψ T L , yielding a decrease in loss and hence a negative Tau for an upward-tending real estate market and vice versa. For both scenarios, the absolute value of the partial derivative takes a maximum value in the vicinity of the EAD. As goes along with intuition, for highly collateralized engagements (C >> EAD), the fluctuations of the collateral value induced by the prolongation of time play a dwindling role.
Conclusion
In this paper, we derived closed-form solutions for the loss given default (LGD) quotas. We therefor focussed on a selected subcase of LGD where loans of the retail sector are collateralized by residential or commercial real estate property. In our opinion, this specification is feasible and reasonable in more than one regards: first, it is one of the most important cases for the retail sector, second, it facilitates the disentanglement of P D and LGD which makes computations tractable and third, it allows for a case-specific and powerful modeling of the collateral value. To the best of our knowledge, the (careful) use of option pricing analogies with respect to methodology and interpretation of sensitivities has not been worked out before in that clearness. For sake of broad applicability, we incorporated typical problems of practitioners' workaday life like cost factors, residual recovery, liquidation periods and existing third-party nominal. Still being in a handy size, we hope that the formulae is attractive for practitioners with useful tools as sensitivities and intuition-feeding graphical illustrations. On the other hand, it may be a starting point for researchers to develop further sector-specific
LGD formulae based on option-pricing arguments.
A Appendix

A.1
Proof of Theorem 3.1: First, we note that E[LP T D |τ = T D ] may be written as Hence the density function of the collateral C T L equals
The calculation of the expected loss profile as a sum of two expectations is done straightforwardly and is left as an exercise. The result is the formula stated in the Theorem.
A.2
The proof of the formula for the delta is done fairly easy. We treat the parameter d and d * as functions of C and get
Applying the chain rule for derivatives we obtain
and
A straightforward application of the product rule establishes the formula.
A.3
The derivation of the sensitivity formula with respect to the parameter T L is slightly more cumbersome. Similarly to the delta case, we treat the variables
where C * = ln(C(1 − k)/(N + EAD)) (analogously for d * ). Further,
Application of the chain rule gives
(analogously for d * ). The final expression follows after applying and combining the product and quotient rule for derivatives and aggregation.
